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KAREEM IBRAHIM
POST-REVOLUTIONARY URBAN EGYPT: 
A NEW MODE OF PRACTICE?
RÉSUMÉ 
Depuis la révolution du 25 janvier 2011, l’Egypte a vu se manifes-
ter une mobilisation croissante, en particulier concernant les questions 
d’urbanisation. Cette mobilisation trouve des échos dans la relation 
qu’entretiennent les citoyens ordinaires à leurs quartiers et à leurs 
villes. Parallèlement, nombre de professionnels se sont engagés plus 
avant dans ce champ, et en appellent au ‘droit à la ville’, demandant 
que nos politiques et pratiques de l’urbanisme laissent plus de place à 
la justice sociale.
Peut-on appeler cela une « nouvelle façon de faire » ? La révolu-
tion a-t-elle été ce moment décisif où les pratiques de l’urbanisme en 
Egypte ont pris une nouvelle direction ? Cet article veut montrer que 
ce n’est pas le cas, et que la mobilisation actuelle n’est qu’une nou-
velle étape dans un mouvement qui a plaidé depuis les années 1940 
pour une pratique alternative de l’urbanisme. Ce mouvement résiste au 
paradigme du développement urbain post-moderne et « par le haut » 
qui prévaut en Egypte.
Cet article retrace le cheminement de ce mouvement, son évo-
lution à travers trois transitions majeures, chacune sous l’inluence 
d’acteurs différents. Le texte décrit aussi comment Takween Integrated 
Community Development – un bureau d’études créé en 2009 – s’est 
construit sur l’héritage de ce mouvement alternatif, réunissant des pro-
fessionnels en lutte pour changer la manière d’envisager l’urbanisme 
en Egypte. Enin, cet article tente d’identiier quelques-uns des déis 
qui attendent encore ce mouvement alternatif, et la manière dont les 
praticiens, les militants associatifs et les défenseurs des droits peuvent 




Mobilisation urbaine, droit à la ville, urbanisme alternatif, activisme 
urbain, pratiques professionnelles.
ABSTRACT
Since the 25 January 2011 Revolution, Egypt has been witnessing 
increased mobilization especially when it comes to urban develop-
ment. This has relected on the relationship between ordinary citizens, 
and their neighbourhoods and cities. In parallel, many professional 
have become more engaged in this ield – calling for the “Right to the 
City” and demanding more social justice in our urban development 
policies and practices.
Can this be called a «new mode of practice»? Has the revolution 
been a decisive moment when urban development practices in Egypt 
shifted from their path? This article argues that this is not the case, and 
that the current mobilization is just another milestone on the path of a 
long movement calling for an alternative urban development practice 
since the 1940s. It is a movement that stands against a high-modernist 
top-down urban development paradigm that still prevails on the scene 
in Egypt.
This article seeks to trace the path of this movement and how it 
evolved over three major transitions – each shaped by different fac-
tors. The article also traces how Takween Integrated Community 
Development – an urban development irm established in 2009 – has 
been building upon the legacy of this alternative movement among 
other professionals – all striving to change the way we approach urban 
development in Egypt. Finally, this article tries to identify some of the 
challenges that still face this alternative movement and how practi-
tioners, community activists, and rights groups can work together to 
overcome these challenges.
KEYWORDS:
Urban Mobilization, Right to the City, Alternative Urban 
Development, Urban Activism, Professional Practice.
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S ince the 25 January 2011 Revolution, the Egyptian society has been witnessing massive mobilization in many different ields. When it comes to urban development, the relationship between academics, 
practitioners, and even ordinary residents on the one hand, and their 
neighbourhoods and cities on the other, has been greatly affected 
by this mobilization. This has resulted in a new phenomenon where 
dialogue on our cities, their realities and their futures has expanded 
beyond the limited academic and professional circles. This dialogue 
now incorporates community activists, new social movements and 
local residents in different neighbourhoods who are gradually becoming 
new active players in shaping our cities. In parallel, and since the 2011 
Revolution, the academic and professional circles in this ield have 
been witnessing an increasing number of voices that call for the “Right 
to the City” and demand more social justice in our urban development 
policies and practices.
Some call this a “new mode of practice”, considering the 2011 
Revolution as a decisive moment when the practice of urban deve-
lopment in Egypt drastically shifted from its path. This article argues 
that this is not the case. It argues that the current mobilization and 
discourse is just another milestone on the path of a long struggle for 
an alternative urban development practice that began in Egypt many 
decades ago, in the 1940s. It is a movement calling for a practice that 
is more contextual; realistic; socially and economically inclusive; and 
environmentally sensitive. This movement was, and still is, in conlict 
with another high-modernist top-down urban development paradigm 
– that prevails on the scene in Egypt and still shapes our policies and 
practices. However, since the 1940s, this movement has been gaining 
more ground, inspiring more people and shaping the practices of many 
professionals today.
This article seeks to trace the path of this movement and how it 
evolved over three major transitions – each shaped by different fac-
tors and circumstances. The article also traces how Takween Integrated 
Community Development – a irm established in 2009 focusing on in-
tegrated urban development – has been building upon the long legacy 
of this alternative urban development movement, trying to become a 
part of it, exploring new avenues for a different professional practice, 
and striving among other Egyptian professionals and activists to change 
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the way we approach urban development in Egypt. Finally, this article 
tries to identify some of the challenges that are still facing this alterna-
tive movement and how practitioners, community activists, and rights 
groups can work together to overcome these challenges.
THE FIRST ENCOUNTERS
Between 1945 and 1947, and based on his successes in using mud 
brick as a low-cost building material, Hassan Fathy – an acclaimed 
Egyptian architect – was commissioned by the Egyptian Department of 
Antiquities to build a village. At the time, the department was looking 
for a low-cost option to relocate the Village of al-Gourna, near the Val-
ley of the Kings in Luxor. For decades, inhabitants of the existing village 
used to tunnel into the slopes beneath their houses and rob the royal 
tombs.
The Egyptian Government, in its attempt to put an end to this des-
truction, asked Fathy to plan and build a new village where the inha-
bitants of al-Gourna could be relocated. To this effect, the Government 
acquired ifty acres of agricultural land near the Nile from a local lan-
downer through eminent domain. This site is currently known as the 
New Gourna Village. The original project entailed the relocation of 
almost seven thousand Gournii who represented ive major tribes that 
used to live in four district zones on the hillside. Accordingly, Fathy’s 
plan for New Gourna responded to this social challenge where this 
four-part division was retained in the design of the new Village. (Steele, 
1997).
The original plan included the construction of specially designed 
houses for the Gournii that respond to their special needs while it-
ting into the complex village street network. In addition, the plan also 
involved the construction of some public buildings and facilities for the 
inhabitants. Despite the completion of most of the originally planned 
public buildings and a signiicant number of the houses, the project ac-
tivities came to a complete halt in 1947 due to various problems with 
the government and the Gournii who resisted the government’s offer 
to relocate them and did not consent to move to Fathy’s New Gourna. 
For several years, many of the village houses remained empty, but, with 
increasing urban growth and pressure from the government to evict the 
old Gourna Village, residents gradually started to move into the New 
Gourna village. (Taragan, 1999).
Almost six decades after the partial completion of the New Gourna 
village, Timothy Mitchell critically examined Fathy’s masterwork in his 
seminal book “Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity”. Mit-
chell shed new light on Fathy’s work by looking at the New Gourna 
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project within its social and political context.
Mitchell’s examination reveals that when it comes to actual imple-
mentation, most of Fathy’s ideas about community participation and 
being more socially sensitive were not put into effect. Rather, Mitchell 
argues that Fathy used an existing political opportunity to implement 
his ideas, regardless of local community’s consent or approval of the 
entire project. In addition, Mitchell also argues that Fathy, given his 
aristocratic background and rich clientele, had an elitist attitude to-
wards al-Gourna’s simple peasants whom Fathy described as unable to 
express their basic needs and considered them as a clear threat to his 
plans. However, Fathy’s endeavour in New Gourna remains one of the 
earliest documented examples of Egyptian architects’ direct engage-
ment – whether positive or negative – with their local communities in 
the twentieth century.
Fathy was not the only Egyptian architect to address social and envi-
ronmental issues in his works and writings at that time. Ramses Wissa 
Wassef (1911-1974) – an Egyptian architect and professor of art and 
architecture – also played a major role with Fathy in establishing a new 
Egyptian vernacular style that was relatively based on traditional Egyp-
tian architecture and the use of local craftsmen and materials. In 1951, 
Wassef also founded his masterwork: the Ramses Wissa Wassef Art 
Centre near the Giza Pyramids to teach young villagers how to create 
their own art and tapestries. The Centre –still active today – consists of 
workshops, exhibition spaces, and residential buildings all originally 
built in mud brick.
Indeed, for decades, the work of both Fathy and Wassef was a source 
of inspiration for generations of Egyptian architects and practitioners. 
Fathy and Wassef’s social engagement; their call for increased aware-
ness of local community needs in the planning and design process; 
their use of local materials and craftsmanship; and their cultural and 
environmental sensitivity were all revolutionary ideas in the mid twen-
tieth century.
However, the mixed messages about Fathy’s endeavour – including 
Mitchell’s critical view – stem from judging Fathy’s work in the light 
of today’s standards and perspectives. For instance, the New Gourna 
project can be seen today as a major breach for the Gournii’s right to 
secure tenure and their right to adequate housing. In fact, Fathy desi-
gned houses that were not lexible enough to cater to the Gournii’s 
demographic growth or their need to accommodate their extended fa-
milies within these houses. This shortcoming resulted into severe urban 
pressures that still negatively affect the village today. Another fact is that 
until today none of the Gournii have received legal titles to their new 
houses. As a result, the Gournii’s tenure status is still legally precarious. 
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In the Egyptian context, the work and ideas of Fathy and Wassef re-
present the irst known documented encounters between professional 
architects and their local communities in the twentieth century – mar-
king the irst important transitions to this alternative practice. Howe-
ver, for decades their work and ideas were also iercely resisted in the 
Egyptian academic and professional institutions even up to the 1970s 
and early 1980s. And despite this criticism and resistance, both Fathy 
and Wassef were swimming against the tide trying to establish a new 
alternative practice that is more socially engaged, environmentally sen-
sitive, and deeply rooted in Egyptian culture. However, this alternative 
practice was in lagrant contradiction with the mainstream high-moder-
nist top-down urban planning paradigm that prevailed in the Egyptian 
scene from the irst half of the twentieth century until today.
This mainstream conventional planning paradigm strongly believed 
in high modernity and the ability of planners and schemers to change 
the lives of millions of people through physical planning. To this effect, 
this planning paradigm promoted colossal development endeavours 
and ‘Grand Projects’ as a tool to change the face of Egypt. And it is not 
surprising to know that the roots of some of these ‘Grand Projects’ that 
still surface from time to time until today are ive decades old, or even 
older. For example, the idea of the Qattara Depression Project – that is 
still proposed today – dates back to 1912 when it was irst proposed by 
a German geographer. Another example is the Toshka New Valley Pro-
ject that was initially proposed as an idea in the 1960s under Nasser. 
This project never came to life until 1997 when the Egyptian Govern-
ment decided to implement it. However, the project was not well stu-
died or planned and turned from a ‘mega-project’ to a ‘mega-failure’. 
This high-modernist top-down paradigm echoed itself in the urban 
planning and urban development practices in Egypt. From modernist 
planning ideologies in the 1960s, to the government policy to build 
new urban communities in the desert in the beginning of the 1980s, 
ending with grandiose plans such as Cairo 2050 and Egypt 2052, it is 
possible to trace the evolution of such a paradigm. What started as a 
quest for modernity in the 1960s, turned into a capitalist dream in the 
1970s and 1980s, then into a neo-liberal planning paradigm that domi-
nated the Egyptian scene for the last two decades.
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION
In the mid-1970s this alternative urban development practice in 
Egypt witnessed a second transition. In 1975, the Egyptian Government 
embarked on the Ismailia Master Plan (IMP) to guide the reconstruction 
efforts of the city of al-Ismailia along the Suez Canal. This process star-
ted after the city of al-Ismailia was considerably damaged during the 
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1973 Arab-Israeli war. The government perceived this reconstruction 
process as a national priority to resettle thousands of residents who 
led the city during the war, and as an opportunity to boost the local 
economy. In line with President Sadat’s ‘open door’ policy towards 
the West, the Egyptian Government commissioned the plans for the 
reconstruction of the canal cities to British consultants in accordance 
with the United Kingdom Oficial Development Assistance (ODA) and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
In 1976, together with some Egyptian professionals, the project 
consultants completed a conventional Master Plan that followed an 
integrated multi-sector planning approach. However, the IMP was 
over-ambitious and did not give enough consideration to scarcity of 
available resources or implementation complexities. As a result, the 
implementation process remained on hold without any progress for 
almost a year. To reactivate the process, the Governor of al-Ismailia 
asked the same planning team in 1977 to select few strategic sites and 
implement some demonstration projects. The decision by then was to 
start upgrading a few dilapidated areas in the city. Consequently, the 
Ismailia Demonstration Projects (IDPs) were conceived to begin the 
implementation process and to give some positive examples of strate-
gies that can be successfully implemented citywide.
This more realistic approach was inally materialized in 1978 with 
the proposed “Hai al-Salam” project in al-Hekr area, located at the 
northern limit of the city. Al-Hekr area – as described in the IMP – was 
an “unplanned progressive urban settlement” perceived as the largest 
informal settlement in the city. The IMP also recorded that al-Hekr area 
had the highest concentration of owner-occupied informal housing in 
the city. The implementation of the “Hai al-Salam” project in al-Hekr 
area was conceived as a model to demonstrate how the policies dei-
ned for the entire city IMP would have been implemented. 
By then, the oficial policy towards informal areas such as al-Hekr 
– and in fact until very recent times – was to demolish such neighbou-
rhoods and relocate their inhabitants to remote and inadequate public 
housing projects. However, the consultants of the project, together 
with some enlightened oficials in the public administration of the city 
suggested something different. What they did was to bring a new vision 
to develop the city and a radically different concept about the role of 
informal housing dynamics. Based on their observations of the actual 
housing dynamics in the city, they realized that in order for residents 
living in informal areas to improve their houses they needed two things: 
security of tenure and basic services. 
Therefore, instead of implementing the conventional top-down 
governmental housing policy of direct provision of housing units, the 
consultants proposed a new strategy that supported the residents to in-
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crementally build and own their dwellings. This radically new concept 
for governmental authorities of that time helped save scarce public re-
sources and followed a much more effective approach. And as a result, 
these public resources were utilized to inance the upgrading of exis-
ting informal areas through expanding the supply of land with minimal 
services. By doing that, the consultants were hoping to regularize infor-
mal construction while inhibiting speculative pressures in real estate 
markets in the city.
To this effect, this new approach adopted a set of policies that were 
new to the Egyptian context at that time. These policies included: pro-
vision of land to low-income families, incremental provision of infras-
tructure following the actual demand, and improved supply and dis-
tribution of building materials. This new set of policies also addressed 
other logistical issues such as providing a inance mechanism based 
on a micro-credit system to support low-income families to build their 
houses, and the simpliication of construction standards and proce-
dures. (Matteucci, 2006).
The Hai al-Salam project – considered as the irst project in Egypt 
to upgrade a large informal settlement – was a major success for the 
IMP efforts that continued until the early 1990s. The rapid development 
of this project and residents’ positive contributions to it presented a 
successful alternative to the top-down government housing policies. 
Its success simply stemmed from its realistic and socially engaging 
approach, and the vigilant observation of the real housing dynamics 
in our cities. But more importantly, the success of the Hai al-Salam 
project laid the foundation of a new era – the institutionalization of the 
alternative urban development approach in Egypt.
In the 1990s, and parallel with the repeated failures of the conven-
tional urban planning paradigm to present viable solutions to the rapid-
ly aggravating problems of urban Egypt, the alternative paradigm conti-
nued to evolve. The efforts this time were spearheaded by two groups 
of actors. The irst group included international development agencies 
such as the ‘Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
– the German Development Cooperation’ (GIZ) and the Aga Khan Trust 
for Culture (AKTC). The second group included the efforts of pioneer 
local individuals as well as some local collective efforts.
In response to the Egyptian Government’s request to ind sustainable 
solutions for the informal areas in Egypt, in 1998 the GIZ launched 
a programme for participatory urban development in Manshiet Nas-
ser in the Cairo governorate. The project expanded in 2002 to cover 
Boulaq el-Dakrour in the Giza governorate. Soon the project evolved 
into the ‘Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas’ (PDP). 
The PDP was the result of cooperation between the GIZ, the German 
Financial Cooperation Developing Bank (KFW), as well as the Egyptian 
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Ministry of Local Development, local NGOs, and the Governorates of 
Cairo, Giza, and Alexandria.
Initially, the PDP activities consisted of three phases between 2004 
and 2014 and have expanded to cover more areas in the three gover-
norates. The primary goals of the programme are to achieve sustainable 
urban development, alleviate poverty in urban areas and attain social 
inclusion, good governance and democracy. The PDP is active in dif-
ferent ields including upgrading informal areas, capacity building of 
local partners, and promotion of active citizen’s participation and de-
centralization.
The PDP efforts succeeded into drawing the attention of many prac-
titioners and decision makers to the governance aspect of urban mana-
gement in Egypt and the value of citizens’ participation in the decision-
making and urban planning process. It also highlighted the need for 
policy change and a good level of decentralization in order to address 
the complex issues of Egypt’s informal areas (PDP, 2013).
Simultaneously with the PDP efforts, AKTC embarked upon the re-
vitalization of al-Darb al-Ahmar district of Historic Cairo in late 1997, 
aiming to build upon the creation of the 30-hectare Al-Azhar Park. Fol-
lowing its completion in 2004, the Park has proven to be a successful 
project receiving almost two million visitors annually. The Park also be-
came a catalyst for urban renewal in the adjacent al-Darb al-Ahmar area. 
However, al-Darb al-Ahmar area – despite its central location, 
strong socio-economic networks, and considerable number of historic 
buildings – has witnessed a continuous deterioration of living condi-
tions over the past three decades. The immediate causes were lack of 
maintenance of infrastructure, low family incomes, and the severe de-
terioration of monuments and private housing.
In order to reverse this deterioration process, AKTC launched its al-
Darb al-Ahmar Revitalization Project in 2000, aiming to improve living 
conditions in the area and its physical assets through greater public 
and private investments, and raising family incomes through extensive 
socio-economic programmes. The project adopted incremental change 
and strengthening of the available socio-economic capital as strategies 
towards the desired change. The project also aimed at the capacity 
building of local stakeholders to achieve long-term sustainability either 
through working closely with responsible government oficials or buil-
ding the capacity of some local NGOs in the area. 
Al-Darb al-Ahmar Revitalization Project operations followed a 
long-term approach that expanded for more than a decade, trying to 
interweave planning, rehabilitation, and conservation activities, with 
socio-economic initiatives. Accordingly, the project encompassed 
the rehabilitation of important monuments and landmark buildings 
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in al-Darb al-Ahmar, together with extensive social development pro-
grammes, including apprenticeship, micro-credit, healthcare, and hou-
sing rehabilitation (Ibrahim, 2007).
Most of the project’s physical activities continued until 2012, lea-
ving behind a rich experience that unfortunately was not thoroughly 
documented. Over a decade of concentrated work, the project ma-
naged to rehabilitate more than a hundred houses in the area, upgrade 
several public open spaces, restore and reuse many public buildings 
and monuments to serve the needs of the area inhabitants, and esta-
blish health and education programmes. The project also created thou-
sands of job opportunities, and boosted economic opportunities in the 
area through vocational training, business development services, and 
microcredit schemes. 
Therefore, and despite the fast deterioration and widespread buil-
ding violations that al-Darb al-Ahmar witnessed after the 25 January 
2011 Revolution, this project is still considered as a milestone in the 
alternative urban development paradigm in Egypt. This is particularly 
due to the strategies the project followed during its lifetime to achieve 
its goals. Contrary to the government conventional urban development 
approach; the project relied on incremental change; participatory plan-
ning and design; integrated socioeconomic and physical interventions; 
and innovative inancial schemes as instruments to achieve tangible 
successes. But more importantly, the project managed to build the ca-
pacity of dozens of young professionals, and inspired the urban plan-
ning and development debate in Egypt for more than a decade.
The work done by the GIZ and AKTC for more than a decade in the 
ield of urban development in Egypt still needs to be seen in a more 
analytical, if not critical, light. Through its work, the GIZ managed to 
establish two informal area Urban Upgrading Units (UUUs) within 
the Cairo and Giza governorates. The UUUs are now governmental 
units within the oficial administrative system responsible for addres-
sing urban upgrading issues in their respective governorates. Through 
its work, AKTC managed to present a viable model for integrated urban 
development of historic areas. It also managed to build the capacity of 
dozens, if not hundreds, of young professionals and government ofi-
cials through actual implementation of many successful interventions.
However, it is dificult to trace effective changes in the existing ur-
ban governance structure in Egypt due to the work of the GIZ and 
AKTC. These organisations successfully managed to have some impact 
on the technical capacity of the local administration. However, they 
did not achieve a similar impact on the administration’s responsiveness 
to local community needs nor its accountability towards the citizens. 
This is primarily due to the impermeable nature of the existing urban 
governance structure in Egypt.
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On the local level, it is evident that local communities did not ini-
tiate any of these development projects; however, they had a say about 
the identiication of their problems, priorities, and what needed to be 
done in their areas. Moreover, the participation process adopted by 
the GIZ and AKTC was economically beneicial to these communi-
ties either through direct engagement of community members in the 
implementation process, or through utilization of existing resources in 
a much more effective manner. However, and despite these successes, 
it is dificult to see real change in terms of better community mobiliza-
tion, organization, or ‘democratization’ from below.
Besides the efforts of these international agencies, the period 
between 1990 and 2001 witnessed some important projects led by 
prominent Egyptian architects and planners. These projects further en-
riched the debate about the viability of this alternative approach. Some 
of these projects were ‘Al-Sayda Zeinab Cultural Park for Children’ by 
Abdel-Halim Ibrahim in 1990. The Park, built in this popular part of 
Cairo, was one of the irst projects especially built for children in Cairo. 
The project did not limit itself to the park site itself, but expanded in the 
neighbouring Abul-Dahab Alley and engaged the local inhabitants in 
issues that related to the upgrading of the surrounding area. 
Between 1994 and 1999, Al-Darb Al-Asfar area in Historic Cairo 
(a small alleyway off al-Mu’izz Street) witnessed another important 
effort – the Al-Suhaymi House Area Conservation Project. This project 
that started by Asaad Nadim as an attempt to restore the 17th Cen-
tury Al-Suhaymi House, soon expanded to restore two other adjacent 
monuments, and rehabilitate the entire alley including the upgrading 
of its infrastructure and the renovation of all its houses, engaging the 
local residents living there. This in itself was an important shift in ofi-
cial practices addressing historic areas in Cairo which usually focus on 
the restoration of listed monuments while ignoring the local residents 
living around them – if not seeking to evict these residents. 
A similar project, and on a larger scale, took place near Coptic Cairo 
in Masr al-Qadima area between 1998 and 2001. The Old Cairo Deve-
lopment Project (Mugamma’ al-Adyan) led by Mona Zakaria involved 
the construction of a market complex, a bus station, and a ire station 
in the area between ‘Amr ibn al-’As and Coptic Cairo. The project also 
included the renovation of almost 350 houses and the upgrading of 
infrastructure networks. The project heavily involved the local residents 
in its activities and managed to present a successful model in this re-
gards.
And last but not least, the end of the 1990s witnessed a relatively 
small but important project – the Cairene Houses Rehabilitation Project 
in al-Darb al-Ahmar. This project that started as a personal initiative by 
Salah Zaki, soon managed to rehabilitate a group of late 19th and early 
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20th century architecturally signiicant houses in al-Darb al-Ahmar. This 
project, that engaged the residents of these houses in the rehabilitation 
process, again, drew the attention to the importance and potential of 
engaging local inhabitants in urban rehabilitation projects.
Besides these important individual efforts, the year 1997 wit-
nessed the establishment of the Egyptian Earth Construction Associa-
tion (EECA) by a group of young Egyptian architects and planners. This 
NGO – inluenced by the ideas of Fathy and Wassef, advocating for 
the adoption of sustainable building technologies and active commu-
nity involvement in urban and architectural projects – was one of the 
very early collective and institutional efforts to promote this alterna-
tive urban planning paradigm in Egypt. Over more than a decade, the 
EECA managed to design and implement various participatory projects 
in different locations all over Egypt – attracting and inspiring dozens of 
young Egyptian professionals. The EECA is still active today, especially 
in the ield of training and capacity building of young Egyptian archi-
tects.
The journey of the protagonists of this alternative urban development 
approach was not an easy one. Despite all of their efforts, their projects 
and ideas remained the exception to a practice and academia mainly 
dominated by high-modernist top-down urban planning and design 
ideas. Moreover, and despite the more institutionalized nature of their 
efforts, the work of these institutions and remarkable individuals did not 
manage to change the failing public urban policies in Egypt. While they 
were advocating to pay more attention to the real problems a majority 
of Egyptians endure in their cities and villages, and trying to ind viable 
solutions to these problems, the state was busy drafting imaginary urban 
master plans and directing the majority of its resources to building new 
cities in the desert that serve the better-off minority of Egyptians.
THE CONTESTATION YEARS 
In 2004, the creation of the Egyptian Movement for Change called 
Kefaya (enough) stimulated political mobilization in Egypt after years 
of stagnation. The movement opposed the continuation of the Mubarak 
rule and the inheritance of authority by his son Gamal. Despite the fact 
that the movement depended on street demonstrations to express itself, 
it remained largely elitist and failed to acquire a signiicant social base. 
However, the debate this movement stimulated marked the beginning 
of a cycle of purely political protest between 2004 and 2006, paving 
the way for other cycles and forms of protest in Egypt.
Another cycle of protests began in 2005-2006 with a more social 
and economic nature. This cycle began with a massive strike which 
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brought 24,000 workers to halt for three consecutive days in the Misr 
Spinning and Weaving Company located in the city of el-Mahalla al-
Kobra. The workers were mainly demanding their bonus and wages 
they should have received. The strikers’ determination was commu-
nicated to the authorities, but it also inspired more workers, civil ser-
vants, teachers, and many other suffering groups of Egyptian society to 
stand up and express demands of social and economic nature (such as 
increased social welfare and wages). 
Fuelled by pressures of economic liberalization policies and lack 
of real political change, the mobilization of labour has had a domino 
effect on social protests. It started an unprecedented number of protests 
that increased dramatically between 2006 and 2010. The snowball ef-
fect of these protests affected large sectors of the Egyptian society. As 
a result, protests have become a general phenomenon in Egypt to the 
extent that social mobilizations have increased from 266 in 2006, to 
614 in 2007, and to 630 in 2008. (Abdalla, 2012).
But what was happening during these turbulent times on the level of 
urban development practice in Egypt? In fact, the urban development 
practice over the past 10 years was to a great extent affected by various 
factors that were closely linked to this political and socioeconomic 
context. Some of these factors were neoliberal and commodiication 
urban policies adopted by the state: increased urban challenges and 
pressures; rise of environmental, social, and economic rights move-
ment in Egypt; and the global economic crisis in 2008 that severely 
affected the global real estate market.
During its last decade the Mubarak regime adopted a neoliberal 
economic policy that left its traces on the urban development context 
in Egypt. The state followed aggressive urban policies where it shifted its 
role from supporting low-income and vulnerable groups, to becoming 
a key player in the real estate market through the continuous com-
modiication of land and housing. And instead of controlling the land 
and housing market, the state contributed to deepening the housing 
crisis through denying the majority of Egyptians’ access to affordable 
land and housing, supporting crony capitalism through the allocation 
of cheap land and resources to key real estate developers, and directing 
the majority of the country’s resources to such real estate development 
projects in the new urban communities.
On the other hand, Egypt was – and still is – facing colossal urban 
challenges and pressures. Egypt is rapidly urbanizing, where in 2010, 
43% of the population were living in urban areas. In 2011, more than 
12 million people were living in informal settlements, over half of them 
in the Greater Cairo Region (Amnesty International, 2011). More than 
60% of Egyptians are under 30 years old –looking forward to more 
housing and job opportunities. Meanwhile urban disparities between 
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the rich and poor continue to rapidly increase. 
For example, while the state was directing scarce resources such as 
water to rich new communities to irrigate golf courses or ill artiicial 
lakes, millions of Egyptians were suffering from decreased access to 
potable water. As a result, in 2007, an uprising that can be termed “the 
Revolution of the Thirsty” broke out. The inhabitants of Burg Al- Burul-
lus, a village in the Kafr al-Sheikh governorate, cut off the coastal road 
in protest against the shortage of water in their village, a shortage that 
forced them to drink polluted water. The action by these inhabitants 
was one among several protests that have prevailed across the country 
in demanding a more equitable distribution of utilities and urban ser-
vices (TADAMUN, 2013).
The governmental response to these challenges and pressures exa-
cerbated the situation and even increased the gap between urban and 
rural sectors; between existing urban areas and new urban communi-
ties; and between poor and rich neighbourhoods within the same city. 
The existing highly centralized urban governance structure in Egypt 
does not allow local residents to voice their needs, hold the govern-
ment accountable for its acts, or support the local level of adminis-
tration to address the needs of the residents especially in underserved 
neighbourhoods.
On the other hand, the top-down planning and urban development 
paradigm of the government continued to thrive. The apex of this pa-
radigm was the state-led “Cairo 2050” urban development plan that 
soon evolved into “Egypt 2050”. The plan had the following vision: 
“By 2050, Egypt is to become a socially and economically developed 
country, active on the regional and international levels”. This plan – 
developed by the General Organization for Physical Planning with the 
help of some local professionals and international organisations such 
as the UN-Habitat – had a positive side to it by focusing on aspects 
of urban governance and its relation to urban deterioration. This is an 
issue from which the Greater Cairo Region is suffering. However, the 
plan also included a set of ‘interesting’ projects mainly aiming at giving 
the Greater Cairo Region a face-lift. Most of these projects proposed 
the demolition of large segments of the existing urban fabric (to the 
extent of wiping out entire neighbourhoods), relocating thousands of 
residents to desert areas, and selling their lands to private investors and 
developers.
The Cairo/Egypt 2050 plan coincided with the establishment of the 
Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF) in 2008. The ISDF 
was established as a funding agency to support the identiication and 
development of unsafe and unplanned urban areas in coordination 
with different governorates and ministries. Initially, the ISDF followed 
a cost recovery mechanism aiming at capturing the revenue generated 
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from relocation of residents from informal areas, selling their land to 
private investors, and reinvesting this revenue in housing projects and 
provision of services to these relocated residents. This approach raised 
legitimate concerns among many practitioners and housing rights 
groups given its potential violation to the residents’ right to adequate 
housing and security of tenure. 
2008-2009 also witnessed another controversial governmental 
endeavour when the then Governor of Luxor adopted an aggressive 
upgrading plan for the city. The plan, originally aiming at the develop-
ment of the city and increasing its role in the tourism industry, resulted 
in massive demolitions of signiicant portions of the city’s urban fabric, 
the eventual loss of valuable architecturally signiicant buildings, the 
expropriation of hundreds of private properties, and the relocation of 
hundreds of families to areas outside the city. This project – represen-
ting a mini experience or model – showed how existing urban areas 
would have been affected and how residents’ rights would have been 
violated if plans such as Cairo 2050 had been implemented. This was a 
real-life demonstration of top-down urban planning paradigm coming 
into practice.
Another important factor that shaped the urban development practice 
during these years was the rise of an active environmental, social, and 
economic rights movement in Egypt. This movement was spearheaded 
by a group of individuals and local organisations who were inspired by 
the rise of the global social and economic rights especially by the end 
of the 1970s following the adoption of the “International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1966 and its coming to force in 1976. This list of orga-
nisations includes, but is not limited to, the Egyptian Centre for Hou-
sing Rights (established in 1997), Habi Centre for Environmental Rights 
(2001), the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (2002), the Egyptian 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights (2009), and the Egyptian Centre 
for Civic and Legislative Reform (2010). These organisations along with 
many individuals, labour movements, local residents and community 
organisations have been working together on issues related to labour, 
health, education, housing, and environmental rights. The struggle of 
these groups has informed many urban development practitioners and 
raised awareness on the importance of the rights-based approach to-
wards solving the problems of our urban areas.
Finally, another factor that inluenced – one way or another – urban 
development practice in Egypt and the choices of many individual pro-
fessionals was the 2008 global economic crisis. The crisis that ironi-
cally began with a housing mortgage problem and as a side effect of the 
inlated real estate markets, soon started to hit the Gulf markets resul-
ting in the shutdown of major real estate operations there. As a result, 
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thousands of professionals suddenly lost their jobs. Slowly, this pheno-
menon started to affect the Egyptian market. Following the 25 January 
Revolution in 2011, the real estate market in Egypt slowed down even 
further following the eruption of various corruption scandals related 
to real estate transactions supported by the Mubarak regime. From an 
ethical point of view, this crisis forced a lot of practitioners to rethink 
the role of real estate business in Egypt, the need to reform this practice, 
and their professional role to support the neediest sectors of the society 
who have long been neglected. Some others were simply looking for 
job opportunities in community-related urban development projects 
since the real estate markets were almost closed. Regardless of their 
motivations, this situation directed attention of an increasing number of 
professionals –especially young graduates – towards community deve-
lopment projects in the urban sector.
THE THIRD WAVE
It is during these contestation years that a “third wave” of the alterna-
tive urban development movement started to take shape and develop. 
This “third wave” grew in response to this evolving social, economic, 
and spatial context, but also in continuum with the previous transitions 
that started in the 1940s and the 1970s. Despite some traces of elitist 
thinking and “social engineering” fantasies that tinted the irst transition 
in the 1940s, the irst encounters between professional architects and 
their communities brought about to this alternative movement environ-
mental sensitivity, attention to community cultural aspects, and respect 
of local building crafts and materials.
The second transition that started in the 1970s contributed to the ins-
titutionalization of the alternative urban development efforts in Egypt 
and had a different nature in terms of the involvement of a considerable 
amount of foreign funding and technical support. It also tried to follow a 
more realistic and incremental approach towards solving the escalating 
urban problems in Egypt. Finally, it raised awareness on issues of active 
community participation, building on existing community assets, and 
the beginnings of a trend that focused on aspects of urban governance 
in terms of building the capacity of state institutions and to some extent 
the responsiveness of these institutions to local community needs.
Building upon the legacy of the 1940s and 1970s transitions, and 
contrary to the prevailing perception, the “third wave” took shape a few 
years before the 25 January 2011 Revolution, not after it. The interaction 
between different urban activists, rights groups, and local communities 
during the contestation years along with the different factors mentioned 
earlier inluenced a small group of professionals – including Takween 
Integrated Community Development. This small group of professionals 
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became convinced – either individually or collectively – that in order 
for this alternative urban development paradigm to move forward, it 
has to address issues that are beyond the 1940s and 1970s contribu-
tions to this paradigm. They became convinced that the crisis is much 
deeper, and that in order for this alternative movement to become more 
inluential it needs to address more critical issues such as social justice, 
equitable distribution of resources, the existing economic structure, 
democratic management of the city, and urban governance in terms of 
state accountability to its citizens.
In 2011, and following the 25 January Revolution, urban Egypt 
started to witness some important developments. Among these deve-
lopments is the rise of new forms of community activism such as the 
Popular Committees – formed during the 2011 Revolution to secure 
their neighbourhoods following the withdrawal of security forces from 
the streets. These committees, mainly comprised of local youth, soon 
started to build upon the momentum of the 2011 Revolution and the 
success of their collective action. And as a result, they directed their ef-
forts to monitor the distribution and provision of governmental services 
in their neighbourhoods. Some of them started to implement actual 
interventions in their neighbourhoods and even propose development 
plans to the authorities which were open and responsive to the efforts 
of these committees at least until mid-2012.
Another important development was the excessive use of social me-
dia by millions of Egyptians. This contributed to improved communica-
tion between different activists, practitioners, and community groups. 
Social media also contributed to raising awareness about the efforts 
of the different groups working on the grassroots level of the urban 
development sector in Egypt. As a result, people came to realize the 
polycentric nature of urban movement either in different neighbou-
rhoods of the same city, or across the entire country. People started to 
become aware of the persistent efforts of local groups in Greater Cairo 
neighbourhoods such as Mit Uqba, Ard el-Liwa, and Izbet Khairallah. 
People also became aware of the struggles of active groups in other 
cities outside of Cairo such as Alexandria, Port Said, Mansoura, and 
el-Minya, all trying to improve their built environment and the living 
conditions in their cities.
However, and despite this mobilization, it is dificult – or at least too 
early – to say that what we are witnessing right now can be considered 
as a “new mode of practice” or a fourth transition on the path of the 
alternative urban development paradigm in Egypt. Rather, it is a conti-
nuum of the efforts of groups of professionals, community activists, and 
rights groups – many of whom started this “third wave” years before 
the 2011 Revolution. The list of the protagonists of the “third wave” 
is long, and before the 2011 Revolution it included blogs such as the 
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“Shadow Ministry of Housing” (launched in 2008), professional entities 
such as Takween Integrated Community Development (2009), and the 
efforts of individuals such Khald Abdel-Halim1 and Dina Shehayeb2. 
After the 2011 Revolution the list expanded to include another group 
of actors including entities such as CLUSTER – the Cairo Lab for Urban 
Studies, Training, and Environmental Research (2011); Megawra – the 
Built Environment Collective (2011); Madd Platform (2011); Save Alex 
(2011); The Egyptian Urban Action Initiative (2012); Takamol Foun-
dation for Sustainable Development (2012); blogs such as Cairo from 
Below (2011) and Cairobserver (2011); and many other active groups 
and individuals.
THE ROLE OF TAKWEEN INTEGRATED COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT
In 2008, a group of seven young Egyptian professionals decided 
to work together in an attempt to address the escalating problems of 
existing urban areas through a different approach. This group encom-
passed architects, planners, and social development professionals – all 
coming from a non-proit background. But in 2009, instead of founding 
a new non-proit organisation, they decided, and managed to establish 
an urban development for-proit social enterprise: Takween Integrated 
Community Development.
They established Takween in response to a foreseen growing demand 
for innovative urban solutions in a world that is rapidly urbanizing. 
Through the establishment of this social enterprise they were aiming to 
develop integrated solutions for the problems of existing urban areas, 
and to complement efforts of other groups tackling urban challenges. 
To this effect, Takween started to focus its work under three thematic 
areas of interventions – built environment development, social deve-
lopment, and economic empowerment through integrated urban deve-
lopment interventions. 
The decision to establish a social enterprise instead of an NGO 
– or any other form of non-proit organisations – was unorthodox in 
2009, especially given the co-founders’ non-proit background. Howe-
1. Abdel-Halim is currently the director of the Local Administration Reform 
Unit, a UNDP program supporting the Ministry of Local Development advi-
sing on measuring good governance and local development. He is also an 
assistant professor of urban policy at the Public Policy and Administration 
Department, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, the American 
University in Cairo.
2. Shehayeb is a professor in the Institute of Architecture and Housing, at 
the Housing and Building National Research Centre (HBRC) in Cairo, Egypt, 
as well as the director of her private consultancy irm Shehayeb CONSULT.
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ver, they decided to follow this path – despite the limitations it might 
impose on them in terms of funding opportunities – for many reasons. 
These reasons included the need to foster better accountability and 
a sense of ownership in the newly established irm. But more impor-
tantly, they wanted to challenge the prevailing perception that differen-
tiates between the “eficiency” of the private for-proit sector on the one 
hand, and the “social purpose” of the non-proit sector on the other. 
They wanted to present a model that is different from the conventional 
Corporate Social Responsibility approach. They wanted to present a 
model that is collaborative, eficient, and inancially sustainable, while 
maintaining a social purpose where integrated urban development is 
the core business.
Similar to other small entities trying to adopt alternative approaches 
towards urban development, inancial sustainability was a crucial issue 
facing Takween. The dilemma was – and still is – how is it possible 
to adopt principles such as the “right to the city”, work closely with 
local communities in a real participatory process, and experiment new 
ideas, while maintaining successful business operations? More impor-
tantly, how is it possible to realize such principles on the ground?
To address this dilemma, Takween tried to develop a cross-subsidy 
model where revenue from for-proit operations and consultancy ser-
vices is reinvested into testing new ideas or supporting local communi-
ties through planning services. And to adhere to its principles, Takween 
has been focusing its efforts on mediating between local communi-
ties and the state institutions, trying to give local communities a voice, 
recognizing local communities’ contributions and building on their 
assets, and inluencing policy making through shedding light on new 
forms of local initiatives. However, implementing this model and trying 
to adhere to these principles was not an easy task. This was evident 
through the different challenges Takween faced during the actual im-
plementation of its various projects and interventions.
One of the projects where the conlict between the high-modernist 
top-down planning paradigm, and the alternative approach adopted by 
Takween manifested itself was the development of an urban regene-
ration of the historic centre of the City of Esna in Luxor. In December 
2009, the Egyptian Government decided to establish a new governo-
rate that encompasses the cities of Luxor, Esna, and Armant under the 
name of Luxor Governorate. Esna – a historic city located 64 kilometres 
to the south of Luxor – was long neglected by the authorities until it 
became part of the newly born governorate. For centuries, Esna was an 
important economic centre and played a major role in serving its local 
region. Therefore, its urban fabric still maintains rich Pharaonic, Greco-
Roman, Coptic, Islamic, and modern layers of history.
In the beginning of the twentieth century, Esna continued to be an 
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important economic centre, especially for trade of textiles, traditional 
clothing, and its famous oil mills. This economic prosperity empowe-
red the local families’ structure and strengthened the existing social 
networks. In the second half of the twentieth century, tourism started to 
become a major source of income for the city. Hundreds of Nile cruises 
on the way between Luxor and Aswan had to stop by Esna for at least 
half a day to cross the old Esna barrage built in 1908. Tourists used this 
waiting time to visit the Esna Temple and wander in the city markets 
– boosting the local economy. However, in 1994 the Egyptian govern-
ment built a new barrage that signiicantly reduced the waiting time. As 
a result, more than 95% of the Nile cruises passing by Esna ceased to 
stop by the city on their way to Luxor or Aswan. The city economy that 
had become largely dependent on mass tourism was severely affected 
due to this tragic shift. Consequently, the city centre surrounding the 
Temple – once thriving with tourists and visitors – suddenly fell into 
decay and became a dilapidated and under populated urban area.
In response to the rising attention given to Esna following its incor-
poration within the new Luxor Governorate, the ISDF commissioned 
Takween team in early 2010 to develop an urban regeneration plan for 
the dilapidated historic centre of the city. This effort was taking place 
in parallel with the implementation of the controversial projects of the 
then Luxor Governor. The Governor by that time was busy excavating 
the Avenue of the Sphinxes connecting the two major temples on the 
Eastern bank of Luxor. To implement his ambitious “vision” he also 
expropriated plenty of private properties and demolished hundreds of 
buildings in Luxor to reshape the city and make it more appealing to 
tourists.
It is within this context when the Takween team – supported by a 
team of young architects from the ISDF – started to work with the local 
residents in the Esna city centre to produce this plan. The project targe-
ted an area of 11 Hectares (26 Feddans) surrounding the Esna Temple, 
bordered by the Nile from the east, and encompassing al-Qisariyya – 
Esna’s main commercial spine. However, the area was mostly identiied 
by the ISDF as an “unsafe area” given its severely dilapidated housing 
conditions. In order to avoid the “conventional” approach in such pro-
jects that usually ends up with some recommendations to support mass 
tourism, the team spent some time in Esna trying to understand from 
different stakeholders the root causes of its severe deterioration.
The preliminary indings were shocking. Out of more than 1,000 
properties in the study area, only 417 buildings were inhabited. There 
were only 692 families living in the study area, out of which 595 fami-
lies were living in unsafe buildings. To develop a better understanding, 
the team had to draw a plot-by-plot map of the entire area (since no 
maps were available for the city centre), conduct a physical survey for 
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all the properties, and carry out social surveys and interviews with all 
the families in the area – not just a sample of them. The indings of this 
in-depth understanding process were quite interesting and guided the 
proposed intervention plan.
First of all, it was evident that the way Esna is promoted and per-
ceived as if it is “only about the Temple” was completely wrong. To the 
contrary, Esna city centre enjoys a multi-layered and complex history of 
different eras. When better understood, Esna represents a unique urban 
centre in Upper Egypt with magniicent architecture that provides a far 
richer experience for visitors when compared to the “one and only” 
Pharaonic image promoted by the state. Moreover, Esna enjoys a dis-
tinguished intangible heritage either in terms of the Sui spirit prevailing 
the city and its surroundings making it an important religious centre, 
its unique social structure where the city centre is subdivided into invi-
sible spatial domains controlled by powerful and deeply-rooted Esna 
families, and last but not least, its traditional crafts serving the local 
needs – all on the verge of extinction.
But what were the real reasons behind the severe deterioration of 
this sophisticated and once vibrant city centre? The irst answer that 
came from many oficials was lack of mass tourism after the 1990s. But 
a deeper investigation revealed that for Esna, mass tourism was not the 
solution, rather, it was the problem. Working closely with local stake-
holders revealed that under the “illusion” of encouraging mass tourism 
as the only viable source of income for the city, for decades, the state 
adopted a set of policies with the aim to make the city more appealing 
to tourists. Consequently, the state worked on isolating the touristic 
zone of the city centre around the temple from its local environment 
through urban planning, administrative, and security control measures. 
For example, the local authorities relocated the main transportation 
hub feeding the city with local visitors from nearby villages – the main 
clients of the city markets – in an effort to keep the villagers away 
from tourists. In addition, police check points were introduced around 
the Temple along vital commercial spines, where local visitors to the 
city markets were regularly stopped and checked by the police forces 
to “secure” the perimeter of the Temple. And despite all this attention 
given to tourism activities, until 2010 Esna city centre lacked any sort of 
functioning sewage network or paved streets. Moreover, the Antiquities 
department imposed a building moratorium on the entire city centre in 
order to “protect” the Temple.
These policies led to a situation where the local economy was al-
most destroyed, local residents lacked basic services or any kind of 
attention to their needs, and they were deprived from restoring their 
houses or building anew despite their strong social ties with the area 
and willingness to invest in improving their living conditions. Simply, 
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the Esna city centre was reengineered by the state to solely serve foreign 
tourists during their short visits to the Temple, through a controlled en-
vironment where the state made sure they did not mingle with local 
residents or villagers. As a result, local residents –especially the well-off 
– started to abandon the city centre, the whole area became a frozen 
asset, and the local economy was severely hit, mainly by lack of local 
clients, and to a less extent, by a lack of tourism.
At that point, it was evident for the Takween team that the solution 
for Esna’s city centre problems was not “more mass tourism”, rather, 
how would local residents of Esna reclaim back their city? Therefore, 
the team proposed a multi-faceted urban regeneration plan, primarily 
dependent on the local community and its assets aiming at restoring 
the physical and socioeconomic vitality of the city centre through three 
main strategies.
First, was to inject life in the local economy of the city markets 
through encouraging local trade, re-establishing transportation 
connections with adjacent villages, and facilitating local trade activi-
ties through more tactful policing measures. Also to give a balanced 
attention to commercial facilities serving tourists on the one hand, and 
the ones serving local residents on the other.
Second, is to strike a balance between heritage preservation require-
ments, and modern development needs of local residents. This balance 
can be achieved through greater public investments in public open 
spaces, basic services, and utilities needed by the residents, effective 
housing rehabilitation programmes, and better urban governance and 
planning measures aiming at responding to the residents’ needs while 
marinating the integrity of this important historic area.
Third, is to promote “responsible tourism” as an alternative to the 
one and only “mass tourism” model promoted by the state and tourism 
agencies. The regeneration plan aimed at increasing the time tourists 
spend in the city, encouraging them to explore it to discover its multi-
layered rich urban heritage, and creating welcome opportunities where 
tourists mingle with the real residents of the city and beneit its local 
economy either in terms of local restaurants, cafes, or shops.
To this effect, the team prepared, with the ISDF, a comprehensive 
regeneration plan where clearly identiied intervention packages along 
the aforementioned strategies were developed. The plan also included 
detailed descriptions of associated costs, responsibilities and contribu-
tions of different stakeholders including local residents, required admi-
nistrative and legal actions, urban planning and management policies, 
and project management structure.
This comprehensive regeneration plan was presented to the Gover-
nor of Luxor in mid-2010. However, following the presentation of the 
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plan, the Governor revealed that during that time he had commissioned 
another group of consultants to prepare a parallel plan. The approach 
of the Governor’s parallel plan was similar to many of the proposals 
of the Cairo 2050 plan and the intrusive urban plans he was aggres-
sively implementing in Luxor. The Governor’s plan was so simple. It 
proposed the demolition of the entire city centre of Esna encompassing 
more than 1,000 traditional buildings, relocating its residents, shifting 
the location of some monuments so they would look visually more 
dramatic, excavation of the entire city centre for almost 5 to 9 meters 
below the existing level to expose the Esna Temple from the Nile, and 
reconstruction of some buildings on terraced plateaus that mimic the 
traditional architecture of the city. The only goal of the governor’s paral-
lel plan was to restore the Esna Temple and its surroundings to their 
“acclaimed” Pharaonic setting to attract more tourism.
In a later stage, the two plans were presented to the Prime Minister 
in 2010 who selected the ISDF plan given its more realistic approach 
and less disruptive social impact. In early 2011 the Revolution erupted, 
and many of Luxor citizens reclaimed back their properties that had 
been expropriated by the state, and neither of the two plans was imple-
mented. However, until today, the ISDF plan remains the ‘oficial’ plan 
for Esna’s city centre. The conlict that erupted between these two plans 
was just another manifestation of the differences between the high-
modernist top-down urban planning approach on the one hand and an 
alternative and more vigilant urban planning approach on the other. 
In fact, Takween projects were not only limited to consultancy ser-
vices for government or international development agencies. Through 
its cross-subsidy mechanism, Takween was able to engage in projects 
directly implemented with local communities such the renovation of a 
limited number of houses in Izbet Khayrallah – one of Cairo’s largest 
informal areas. In 2011, Takween funded and implemented an initia-
tive aiming at improving the facades of a group of houses there. This 
was an effort to shift the negative image promoted by the media about 
such neighbourhoods and prove that a little investment and attention 
can reintegrate these neighbourhoods into our city. The initiative en-
gaged the residents through sharing the renovation cost and deciding 
what needs to be done to their houses, while using low-cost environ-
mentally friendly materials. The initiative proved to be successful and 
encouraged another foundation to request Takween services to repeat 
the same experiment on a larger scale in Manshiet Nasser – another 
large informal area in Cairo – in early 2012.
What was really important about such initiatives is that they started 
a direct dialogue between Takween and the local community mem-
bers. In Izbet Khairallah, this little intervention and continuous dia-
logue gave Takween some credibility to discuss with the local activists 
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and concerned citizens on issues related to the larger urban context 
and problems of their neighbourhood. These interactions also explored 
possible avenues to upgrade the area through partnerships between 
local community groups, the government authorities, and Takween as 
a professional entity.
Another trajectory that Takween follows is advocacy on issues rela-
ted to the Right to the City through initiatives like TADAMUN: The Cai-
ro Urban Solidarity Initiative. The TADAMUN Initiative is the result of 
collaboration between Takween and the American University in Wash-
ington D.C. (AU). The TADAMUN initiative tries to encourage citizens 
of Cairo as well as other Egyptian city dwellers to claim their “right 
to the city”. The initiative is based on the assumption that solidarity 
among citizens is the only way to achieve social justice and a decent 
standard of living, particularly for many who have been ignored for 
too long such as the residents of the dilapidated inner-city quarters or 
informal areas. 
Through its irst phase completed by mid-2013, TADAMUN focused 
on the documentation and dissemination of case studies from the Egyp-
tian context that have to do with actual improvements of the living 
conditions of residents of urban and peri-urban areas. Through this do-
cumentation, TADAMUN tried to see how these successes are linked 
to different urban and environmental rights and how they can impact 
existing urban policies. During its second phase planned until end of 
2014, TADAMUN addresses issues related to institutional reform and 
working with other partners to establish a National Urban Reform Coa-
lition – encompassing interested urbanists, rights groups, and concer-
ned citizens – aiming at the reform of urban development policies and 
practices in Egypt.
In 2013, TADAMUN also launched an ‘Urban Constitution Cam-
paign’ with other partners3. The campaign aimed to familiarize Egyp-
tian citizens with a set of urban and environmental rights, which are 
directly related to the quality of life in our cities. The campaign encou-
raged citizens to demand their different rights to the city and to strive 
towards including as many of these rights as possible into the newly 
drafted Egyptian constitution. The campaign was based on previous do-
cuments addressing the same issues such as Mithaq al-Tanmiyya wa al-
Omran (The Charter of Development and Urbanization) and al-Ommal 
wa al-Fallahoun Yaktoboun al-Dostour (Workers and Peasants Write the 
3. Besides the main TADAMUN collaborators (AU and Takween), the ‹Urban 
Constitution Campaign› partners included the Egyptian Center for Civic and 
Legislative Reform, the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, 
the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, the Housing and Land Rights 
Network – Habitat International Coalition, Shadow Ministry of Housing, and 
Al-Shehab Institution for Promotion and Comprehensive Development.
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Constitution)4. The campaign also relied on extensive research by TA-
DAMUN over one year to analyse more than 120 constitutions in light 
of the different aspects of the right to the city.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of Takween and many other entities supporting the 
alternative urban development paradigm in Egypt has been thriving 
since 2008. But does this mean we can see a real shift in the urban 
development policies and practices in Egypt? It is not easy to ind a 
quick afirmative answer to this question. It was hoped, following the 
25 January 2011 Revolution, that the state planning approach would 
become more realistic and deliberative. Unfortunately, that was not the 
case. Despite the fact that most of pre-revolution megaprojects were 
put on hold, the planning paradigm relying on such projects as the 
“only” solution to Egypt’s urban problems remained intact. Therefore, 
it was not surprising to see that plans such as Egypt 2050 have become 
Egypt 2052. It was not surprising either to see that governmental plans 
to build one million housing units or dozens of new cities in the desert 
(all inherited from the Mubarak era) are still promoted by post-revolu-
tion governments as the solution to our urban problems – while igno-
ring millions of inhabitants living in the existing urban areas.
Following the events of 30 June 2013, the newly appointed govern-
ment started to pay some attention to the escalating problems of the 
existing urban areas, especially the informal ones. Perhaps this was 
because of the increased, though unfulilled, expectations of their inha-
bitants following the 2011 Revolution. For example, the constitutio-
nal document ratiied in January 2014 includes unprecedented articles 
about development plans for informal and remote areas. And perhaps it 
is a coincidence that the state – just 10 days before constitution referen-
dum – pledged the investment of EGP 350 million to upgrade 30 infor-
mal areas in Cairo and Giza Governorates through the ISDF as a inan-
cing facility and the Armed Forces as an implementing agency (Farid, 
2014). And inally, during several popular meetings in early 2014 with 
residents of informal areas such as ‘Izbet Khayrallah, we see state ofi-
cials such as the Governor of Cairo or the Minister of Housing shying 
away from relocation plans long adopted by the state, or condemning 
negative labelling of unplanned urban areas as ‘informal’.
4. In 2012 and 2013 along with the constitutional reform process, Egypt 
witnessed the efforts of several groups all trying to positively contribute to 
the constitution drafting process in several aspects. The result of these efforts 
was a wealth of constitutional documents and proposals that engaged large 
segments of professionals and concerned citizens.
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Can this be considered a real shift from the state’s long-adopted top-
down urban planning policies? In fact, to answer this question we need 
to investigate some aspects that shaped and nourished this top-down 
approach in the irst place. First and foremost is the urban governance 
structure in Egypt – has it really changed? Has it become more delibe-
rative? Do residents of different areas have the means to voice their real 
needs in an institutional manner? Can they participate in urban deve-
lopment plans and monitor the expenditure of public budgets in their 
neighbourhoods? Do they have access to these plans and budgets in 
the irst place? Can they hold the state accountable to its acts? Can they 
shift the existing disparities in allocation of resources between different 
neighbourhoods? And are they inally able to elect their governors and 
district managers5?
The second point is the existing economic structure: have we really 
moved away from the neoliberal economic policies adopted by the 
Mubarak regime? Have we stopped supporting big industry tycoons, 
and started to support small and medium enterprises? Are we engaging 
small-scale contractors and professional irms in the new housing and 
upgrading projects, or are all of these projects appointed to gigantic 
companies and the Armed Forces? Do local communities and small-
scale enterprises capture the revenue and proits of these projects, or 
do they all go to the “usual” key players in this game?
Third, and last, has the professional urban development practice 
really changed? How were urban development plans such as Cairo 
2050 – resulting into the displacement of thousands of residents – pro-
duced in the irst place? Were they produced by state oficials and 
governors, or by professional planners and architects? Have these mas-
sive relocation plans and violations of residents’ rights been shamed 
by the professional community? Do architects and planners feel more 
responsible now for their acts towards their local communities? Has 
planning and architectural education shifted from high modernist and 
neoliberal fantasies, to a more bottom-up and grassroots approach that 
realistically responds to the problems of our cities and the needs of our 
local residents? 
The aforementioned questions have their own relections on the 
daily practices of the professionals striving to promote the alternative 
urban planning paradigm. For instance, activists, urbanists, and profes-
sionals face an escalating problem in terms of representing their local 
communities vis-à-vis the state or trying to ind sustainable entry points 
into state institutions. Following the 2011 Revolution – and for a couple 
of years – there was a window of opportunity where local communi-
5. For more discussion on this topic, see the Ibrahim/Singerman’s article in 
this issue.
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ties, Popular Committees and professionals were able to approach state 
oficials and ind listening ears to their upgrading proposals. Unfortuna-
tely, as the revolutionary moment fades away and the state reclaims its 
powers, this window of opportunity is closing down before the chance 
to turn it from an ad-hoc project-based exceptional practice, to a nor-
malized communication channel and institutionalized entry point to 
state institutions.
Another challenge facing professionals working on the alternative 
urban development movement today is the question of patronage and 
inancial sustainability. How can these small entities and professionals 
survive inancially through these turbulent times? In fact, for the time 
being, many of their activities are inancially supported by donor groups 
and development agencies who believe in the same principles they are 
trying to promote and live by. But what would be the situation if this 
funding was not available anymore? We also witness various positive 
initiatives from these entities and professionals working for free trying 
to voluntarily support local communities to develop urban develop-
ment plans and interventions. For how long can these entities and pro-
fessionals continue this practice before they are inancially exhausted 
and psychologically burnt out?
And inally, how can these entities and professionals get their ef-
forts recognized beyond the closed professional circles, conferences, 
events and academic publications? How can they reach out to more 
communities? How can this alternative practice become adopted by 
more professionals and organisations? How can these ideas inluence 
the academic practice, and the architectural and planning education? 
Simply, how can the alternative urban development paradigm become 
mainstream and have a real impact on our cities and urban areas?6
The newly emerging entities and professionals including Takween 
and many others are trying to address some of these challenges. They 
try to engage with state oficials in their practices to better understand 
and try to change the way the state functions in terms of urban plan-
ning policies. They are trying to advocate for the need for more open, 
deliberative and accountable urban governance structure. They are 
trying to develop cross-subsidy models where income-generating pro-
jects within their entities can inance their voluntary work with local 
communities. They are disseminating their work either through direct 
encounters, social media, or writings to outreach to more people. And 
inally, they are trying to institutionalize their efforts and build upon the 
polycentric nature of the “third wave” to create networks of inluence, 
support, and collaborative work among each other. 
6. See Elhady/Nagati and Safey Eldeen in this issue.
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Despite these important developments the “third wave” brought 
about, the protagonists of this wave still need to do more. They need 
to actively address the state, its policies, practices, and its stagnant 
dysfunctional urban governance structure. They need to question the 
existing economic structure and call for a more equitable distribution 
of resources, effective development policies that support small and me-
dium enterprises, and a better distribution of revenues of development 
within local communities.
They need to hold the state accountable for its responsibilities to-
wards investing more resources in informal areas rather than relying 
on self-help initiatives. And last but not least, they need to develop 
and disseminate a code of professional conduct where urban planning 
practices violating the basic rights of local residents are shamed, if not 
prohibited.
What we are witnessing right now is another transition on the path 
of the alternative urban development movement in Egypt that began in 
the 1940s. Despite massive mobilization by local residents and urban 
activists in different neighbourhoods that boosted this movement over 
the past few years, protagonists of this movement still need to think 
beyond this mobilization. They need to think: what is next?
How can the supporters of the alternative urban development mo-
vement shift the attention from Cairo 2050 to the critical problems of 
Cairo 2014? How can they shift existing urban planning policies from 
“eradication of the poor” to “eradication of poverty”? How can their 
isolated little-known experiences evolve and have a real impact? And 
how can their practices move from being a sort of “activism” or an 
exception to the rule, to become the mainstream? 
Perhaps there are some answers to these questions and challenges. 
But deinitely one of these answers would be moving beyond creating 
a parallel practice, to renegotiating the rules of the game.
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